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REAL PROPERTY - LmNs - HusBAND's CoNTRAcr FOR IMPROVEMENTS ON 
LAND OWNED JOINTLY WITH WIFE-A husband alone contracted for the 
construction of a house on property owned jointly with his wife. The wife 
inspected the progress of the work, took part in directing it, and later oc-
cupied the house. In an equity proceeding by the contractor to establish 
and enforce a mechanic's and materialman's lien on the premises for the 
balance due under the contract, the trial court rendered a decree for the 
contractor. On appeal, held, reversed. Since there was no showing that 
the husband contracted as an agent of the wife, and the evidence does not 
support a finding that she ratified his acts, the wife's interest cannot be sub-
jected to a lien or sold to satisfy a judgment rendered against the husband 
on the contract. Elder v. Stewart, 114 So. 2d 263 (Ala. 1959). 
Where property is held by a husband and wife in joint tenancy or by the 
entireties, the husband, in the absence of a statute to the contrary,1 cannot 
subject the estate to a mechanic's lien without the consent of his wife.2 
Proof of the husband's agency for the wife ·will satisfy the consent require-
ment, however, and several states having statutes expressly covering this 
problem provide for a presumption of agency where the wife fails to give 
notice in the manner provided of her objection to the improvements.a In 
other jurisdictions the statutes do not deal expressly with the husband-and-
wife situation, but it is included under broader agency provisions. Statutes 
of this latter type often provide that unless notice of non-assent to the im-
provements is given, the interest of a noncontracting mvner who has 
knowledge of the improvements will be subject to the lien on a presumption 
either of agency4 or ratification.5 Such "implied consent" provisions have 
been criticized as unfair to the noncontracting owner because an actual 
objection which is not expressed in the limited and formal manner required 
1 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 82, §3 (1959); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §60-1401 (1949) (estate 
subject to lien on the contract of either spouse). "Where land is held as community prop-
erty, and statutes give the husband management and control thereof, he may bind the 
estate by his contract. Brick &: Tile, Inc. v. Parker, 143 Tex. 383, 186 S.W.2d 66 (1945). 
Compare R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §34-28-1 (1956) (written consent of wife necessary for lien 
to attach); MICH. COMP. LAws §570.2 (1948) (no lien unless both spouses sign the contract). 
See Burman v. Ewald, 192 Mich. 293, 158 N.W. 853 (1916). 
2Roper v. Clanton, 258 S.W.2d 283 (Mo. App. 1953); Barry v. Barry, 147 Neb. 1067, 
26 N.W.2d 1 (1947); Katauskas v. Lonstein, 266 Mass. 29, 164 N.E. 810 (1929). 
3 FLA. STAT. §84.12 (1959); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:44-69 (1952); 32 N.Y. LIEN LAWS §3; 
Omo REv. CODE ANN. §13ll.I0 (Baldwin 1958); TENN. CoDE ANN. §64-1103 (1955). See 
also Wvo. STAT. ANN. §29-3 (1957). The agency created is limited to the consent issue, 
and does not impose personal liability upon the wife. Meadows Southern Const. Co. v. 
Pezzaniti, 108 So.2d 499 (Fla. App. 1959). See also BLANC, N.Y. MECHANICS' LIENS 1)23a 
(Winard ed. 1949). Except in Ohio and Wyoming, the notice of objection must be written, 
and either given to the contractor or filed with the county clerk. 
4 ALASKA COMP. LAws ANN. §26-1-4 (1949); CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE §ll83.l; COLO. REv. 
STAT. ANN. §86-3-5 (1953); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 178, §35 (1954); MINN. STAT. §514.06 
(1957); NEv. REv. STAT. §108.140 (1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. §61-2-10 (1953); ORE. REv. STAT. 
§87.030 (1953); S.C. CoDE §45-258 (1952); S.D. CODE §39.0706 (1939). See Comment, 68 
YALE L.J. 138, 157-159 (1958) for statute comparison. 
5 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, §28 (1930). 
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by the statutes is insufficient to overcome the presumption of agency; thus 
an owner may be deprived of his property without his consent.6 It is in-
deed difficult to understand why it would be less fair to require the con-
tractor to suffer the consequences of his failure to examine the record, 
unless such a requirement would unduly impede the improvement of real 
property. The statute in the principal case7 and those found in a majority 
of jurisdictions do not afford the contractor the benefit of a presumption. 
This type of statute does not permit a lien upon an owner's interest unless 
the materials or labor are furnished upon his contract, consent, or instance.s 
The burden is upon the lien claimant to show the wife's consent to her 
husband's contract.9 In the absence of her express contract or consent, the 
theory most widely employed to establish a lien is that of implied agency, 
although an occasional court speaks of ratification10 or estoppel.11 
There is no certain standard of conduct from which an inference of 
agency may be drawn, and the holdings have not been as consistent as one 
might wish. The fact of the marital relation alone does not justify an 
inference that the contracting husband was acting as his wife's agent.12 
Likewise, evidence showing merely that the wife was living on the premises 
at the time of the contract,13 or that she passively acquiesced in the im-
provements,14 will not support such a result. It has been suggested that 
a mere "wifely interest" in the husband's affairs does not demonstrate her 
consent to the contract,15 and even that the same conclusion will follow 
where the wife leaves such affairs generally to the husband, approving what-
ever he might do.16 On the other hand, ex.tensive activity and participation 
by the wife will usually indicate an implied agency, and her execution of a 
trust deed to obtain funds with which to discharge the contractor's claims 
6 Myhre, Fiction, Fallacy and Facts in Relation to "Implied Consent" Provisions of 
Certain Mechanics' Lien Statutes, 32 MINN. L. R:Ev. 559 (1948). Notice must usually be 
personally served or posted. For a discussion of questions of due process, see Chears Floor 
&: Screen Co. v. Gidden, 159 Miss. 288, 131 So. 426 (1930). But maximum security for con-
tractors might be justified in view of the dangers of unjust enrichment and fraudulent 
collusion. See Wilson v. Logue, 131 Ind. 191, 30 N.E. 1079 (1892). See also Notes, 50 MICH 
L. R:Ev. 482 (1952), 29 CoLUM. L. R:Ev. 996 (1929). · 
7 ALA. CODE tit. 33, §37 (1940). 
s E.g., ibid. (contract); CONN. GEN. STAT. R:Ev. §49-33 (1958) (agreement or consent); 
GA. CoDE ANN. §67-2001 (1957) (employment); IDAHO CODE ANN. §45-501 (Supp. 1959) (in-
stance). 
9 Compare Barry v. Barry, supra note 2, with Fischer v. Meiroff, 192 Wis. 482,213 N.W. 
283 (1927). 
10 E.g., Taggart v. Kem, 22 Ind. App. 271, 53 N.E. 651 (1899); principal case at 265-266. 
llSee Bell Bros.&: Co. v. Arnold, 17 Tenn. App. 493, 68 S.W.2d 958 (1933). However, 
estoppel should not apply unless the builder relied upon the wife's conduct in entering 
into the contract. 
12 General Air Conditioning Co. v. Douglass, 241 N.C. 170, 84 S.E.2d 828 (1954); 
Blenard v. Blenard, 185 Md. 548, 45 A.2d 335 (1946). 
13 Koehring v. Bowman, 137 N.E. 767 (Ind. App. 1923), rev'd on other grounds, 194 
Ind. 433, 142 N.E. 117 (1924). 
14See R. D. Kurtz, Inc. v. Field, 223 Mo. App. 270, 14 S.W.2d 9 (1929). 
15 E. C. Robinson Lumber Co. v. Lowrey, 276 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. App. 1955). 
16 William Penn Supply Corp. v. Watterson, 218 Md. 291, 146 A.2d 420 (1958). 
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has been held important in reaching such a result.17 Between these ex-
tremes lies a wide range of conduct concerning which there is apparent 
conflict in authority. While some courts require the evidence of agency 
to be "strong and persuasive,"1s due to the nature of the estate involved,19 
others have permitted the inference upon relatively slight evidence.20 Al-
though in the principal case acts of the wife were enumerated which in 
other jurisdictions might be sufficient to permit an implication of agency, 
the court stated flatly that no such relationship was shown.21 The court 
further held the doctrine of ratification inapplicable, since it did not ap-
pear that the wife had knowledge of all the material facts, or that the 
husband entered into a contract as her avowed agent.22 This is undoubtedly 
a correct view, for a wife cannot ratify an act of her husband which he did 
not purport to do on her behalf,23 and a contract ostensibly and actually 
made by a person solely on his own behalf cannot be appropriated by an-
other through "ratification.''24 The result reached in the principal case 
might seem unduly lenient toward the wife when viewed in the light of a 
policy which seeks to provide substantial security to mechanics and mate-
rialmen. Yet it was not inconsistent with the applicable statute, and if 
greater protection for contractors is deemed necessary, the initiative should 
rest with the legislature. 
Judd L. Bacon, S.Ed. 
17Wittichen v. Miller, 179 Tenn. 352, 166 S.W.2d 612 (1942); Magidson v. Stem, 235 
Mo. App. 1039, 148 S.W.2d 144 (1941). See Taggart v. Kem, supra note IO. But the mere 
execution of a trust deed, standing alone, would probably not be sufficient to prove agency. 
See E. C. Robinson Lumber Co. v. Lowrey, supra note 15. Nor is it sufficient if the wife is 
unaware of the items to which the funds are to apply. R. D. Kurtz, Inc. v. Field, supra 
note 14. 
18 Compare Wilson v. Fower, 236 Mo. App. 532, 155 S."W.2d 502 (1941) (evidence that 
wife knew of plumbing installation, approved the work, selected colors and suggested 
location of bathroom fixtures held insufficient as a matter of law) with E. C. Robinson 
Lumber Co. v. Lowrey, supra note 15 (a lien on the premises held justified where wife 
helped select materials, was present while work was in progress, gave instructions to the 
builders, and joined in a deed of trust). 
10 See 'Wilson v. Fower, supra note 18. 
20 In 'Wilson v. Logue, supra note 6, an agency was found to exist where the wife knew 
of the contract, was present when the materials were delivered and used, and failed to 
object. 
21 Principal case at 265. 
22 Id. at 265-266. 
23 Cyclone Fence Co. v. McAviney, 121 Conn. 656, 186 Atl. 635 (1936). See General Air 
Conditioning Co. v. Douglass, supra note 12; Gould v. Maine Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
ll4 Me. 416, 96 Atl. 732 (1916). 
24 See MECHEM, AGENCY §§377, 386-387, 390 (2d ed. 1914). Actual authority must also 
have been present in order to hold an undisclosed principal. Id. §1764. 
